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Judith S. Kaye: A Chief Judge for
Families and Children
ANDREW SCHEPARD*

Introduction
Judith S. Kaye served as the first female associate judge of the New
York Court of Appeals (the state’s highest court) from 1983–1993, and
as the court’s first female chief judge from 1993 until her mandatory
retirement in 2008 at the age of 70.1 As chief judge, she played a dual role:
presiding over the Court of Appeals and serving as the administrative head
of the sprawling New York State Unified Court System, which, at the time
of her death in 2016, had a budget of $2.5 billion and 16,000 employees.2
Chief Judge Kaye’s extraordinarily eventful judicial tenure confronted:
• September 11th: It fell to Chief Judge Kaye to rally the court
system after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001, when three court officers lost their lives

* Andrew Schepard is the Sidney and Walter Siben Distinguished Professor of Family Law
and Director of the Center for Children, Families and the Law, at the Maurice A. Deane School of
Law at Hofstra University. He is Editor Emeritus of the Family Court Review. He was appointed
to the New York State Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for Children (described later
in this article) by Chief Judge Kaye, and he worked with her on a number of family-law-related
projects. He gives a special thank you to his research assistants, Kaitlyn McCracken, Evelyn
Gitsin, and Laura Fallick, Hofstra Law School Class of 2022, for their invaluable help.
1. Sam Roberts, Judith S. Kaye, First Woman to Serve as New York’s Chief Judge, Dies
at 77, N.Y. Times (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/08/nyregion/judith-s-kayefirst-woman-to-serve-as-new-yorks-chief-judge-dies-at-77.html.
2. Id.
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during rescue efforts and major court buildings were rendered
unusable due to dust and air-quality problems.3
• Jury Reform: Chief Judge Kaye dramatically improved the
treatment of jurors. She eliminated virtually all automatic
exemptions from the jury pool, thus diversifying and expanding
it. Even lawyers became eligible to serve on juries. Chief Judge
Kaye also eliminated the automatic sequestration of jurors, thus
easing the emotional and economic strain of jury service.4
• The Need for a Commercial Division: Chief Judge Kaye created
a Commercial Division in the New York State Supreme Court (the
misleadingly named trial court of general jurisdiction) to ensure
that New York courts would continue to be a leading center for
resolving business disputes.5
• The Death Penalty: Chief Judge Kaye repeatedly voted to strike
down New York’s death penalty laws.6 As a result, no one was
executed in New York State during her tenure on the Court of
Appeals.
This tribute, however, focuses on Chief Judge Kaye’s special passion—
the welfare of families and children involved with the legal system. The
question of how to improve the relationship between the legal system,
families, and children was always at the center of Chief Judge Kaye’s
judicial universe. Her accomplishments in this area make her a candidate
for the most consequential family law judge in American history. More
specifically:
• As a judge of the highest court of an influential state, Chief Judge
Kaye authored seminal opinions (including dissents that eventually
found their way into the judicial or legislative mainstream) on

3. See Thomas A. Birkland, Emergency Planning and the Judiciary: Lessons from
September 11, at 1 (Ctr. for Ct. Innovation 2004), https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/
default/files/emergencyplanning.pdf.
4. Hon. Jonathan Lippman, Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye: A Legacy of Visionary Leadership,
10 Gov’t, Law & Pol’y J., Winter 2008, at 4, 6; see also Somini Sengupta, New Law Releases
Juries in New York from Sequestering, N.Y. Times, May 31, 2001.
5. Commercial Division—N.Y. Supreme Court, History, N.Y. State Unified Ct. Sys., http://
ww2.nycourts.gov/courts/comdiv/history.shtml (describing creation of Commercial Courts
Task Force by Chief Judge Kaye in 1995 and her establishing commercial divisions in judicial
districts statewide that same year).
6. Roberts, supra note 1. See generally Deborah L. Hiller, Death Becomes the State: The
Death Penalty in New York State Past, Present and Future, 28 Pace L. Rev. 589 (2008); see also
People v. Smith, 468 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 1984).
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same-sex marriage and adoption, de facto parenting, domestic
violence, and child abuse and neglect.7
• As a judicial administrator, Chief Judge Kaye:
• Created problem-solving courts that changed the way courts
addressed family-related problems like domestic violence, mental
illness, and drug abuse.8
• Established that counsel for a child has the same duty of
vigorous advocacy for the client’s preferences that lawyers for
adults do.9
• Created an interdisciplinary institution within the state court
system—the Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for
Children10—to develop and advocate for positive policy changes
on behalf of children.11
After providing a brief biography of Chief Judge Kaye, this essay
will provide an overview of these accomplishments for families and
children. Space does not allow for a full discussion of all of Chief Judge
Kaye’s landmark achievements for families and children. For example,
in 1997 she took a step towards increasing transparency of family
court proceedings by issuing new administrative rules that encouraged
family court judges to open proceedings to the press and public, subject
to exceptions such as the need to protect the privacy of the children
involved.12 As the New York Times noted at the time, few states “ha[d]
made public access the norm in the wide array of sensitive cases that come
before Family Courts, including adoptions, child abuse and neglect cases
and termination of parental rights.”13 In the public announcement of the
rule, Chief Judge Kaye emphasized that “[i]t is vital that the public have
a good understanding of the court and confidence in the court process.”14

7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. NYS Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for Children, N.Y. State Unified Ct.
Sys., https://nycourts.gov/ip/justiceforchildren/index.shtml (last visited May 13, 2022).
11. See infra Part V.
12. See In re Application for News Media Coverage in the Matter of M.S., 662 N.Y.S.2d
207, 209 (Fam. Ct. 1997) (recognizing presumption of open family court proceedings that “may
be overcome only by a finding that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest”).
13. See Alan Finder, Chief Judge in New York Tells Family Courts to Admit Public, N.Y.
Times (June 19, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/19/nyregion/chief-judge-in-newyork-tells-family-courts-to-admit-public.html.
14. Id.
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A longer and more in-depth analysis of all of her accomplishments for
families and children awaits a full biography, which Chief Judge Kaye
richly deserves.
Whenever possible, this essay will incorporate Chief Judge Kaye’s own
words to describe her family law achievements. Some of the quotations
come from her judicial opinions; more come from an extensive oral history
of her life and career that Chief Judge Kaye provided to the Historical
Society of the New York Courts in 2011 after her retirement and are
included with the permission of the Historical Society.15

I. A Brief Biography of Chief Judge Kaye16
Nothing in Chief Judge Kaye’s background indicated that she would
focus her judicial energy on bettering the lives of families and children in
court. The future chief judge, then Judith Ann Smith, was born in 1938 to
Jewish immigrant parents living on a farm near Monticello, New York. Her
parents, Benjamin Smith and the former Lena Cohen, opened a women’s
clothing store when she was six, where she worked from about the age of
12 through college.17
After graduating high school at age 15 (she skipped two grades) and
attending Barnard College, the future Chief Judge Kaye began what she
thought would be a career in journalism. She abandoned her journalism
ambitions to go to NYU Law School at night and graduated sixth in her
class.18 She worked at two major commercial law firms and was named
the first female partner at one. She married a colleague at one of the firms,
Stephen Rackow Kaye, and had three children and, eventually, seven
grandchildren.19
During his campaign, Governor Mario M. Cuomo promised to name a
woman to the then-all-male New York State Court of Appeals. Soon after
taking office in 1983, he appointed Judge Kaye.20
A decade later, the same Governor Cuomo elevated Judge Kaye to
Chief Judge Kaye at a particularly dark time in the history of the Court
of Appeals. Sol Wachtler, the chief judge whom Judge Kaye replaced,

15. Anne C. Reddy & Hon. Robert M. Mandelbaum, An Oral History of Hon. Judith S. Kaye,
conducted on September 26, 28, 2011 and October 19, 20, 2011 at Skadden, Arps, Meagher &
Flom LLP by the Historical Society of the New York Courts [hereinafter Kaye, Oral History].
16. This biographical sketch draws heavily on Roberts, supra note 1.
17. Judith Smith Kaye, Hist. Soc’y of the N.Y. Cts., https://history.nycourts.gov/
biography/judith-smith-kaye/.
18. Roberts, supra note 1.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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“abruptly resigned in disgrace after his arrest on charges of blackmailing
his former lover and her daughter in a bizarre attempt to win back the older
woman’s affections.”21
Chief Judge Kaye undertook the task of rebuilding the Court of
Appeals after the Wachtler fiasco. She proved herself to be a “collegial
consensus builder” but, as discussed subsequently, dissented when her
convictions called for it.22 As also discussed subsequently, she undertook
her administrative responsibilities as head of the court system with great
vigor. She rejected “overtures to join the Clinton administration after 1992
as attorney general and a possible Supreme Court nomination.”23
Chief Judge Kaye served on the Court of Appeals until 2008, when
she reached the mandatory retirement age of 70.24 While of counsel to
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom she continued to work on behalf
of families and children through her membership on important boards and
commissions. She died in January 2016 at the age of 77.25

II. Chief Judge Kaye’s Major Family Law Opinions
Chief Judge Kaye’s major family law opinions—several of which
were dissents—establish her as a champion of nontraditional families
and particularly sensitive to the emotional needs of children. Several
interpreted outdated or contradictory statutory language that cabined the
legal definition of family to traditional relationships by blood, marriage, or
adoption. Some of Chief Judge Kaye’s Court of Appeals colleagues opted
to wait for the legislature to expand the outdated language to include less
traditional family structures such as same-sex couples. Chief Judge Kaye,
in contrast, did not believe the courts should wait for legislative change.
Rather, she applied a child-friendly canon of statutory interpretation to
resolve plausible ambiguities in a statute affecting children—the child’s
best interests, which have always been a subject of special judicial
solicitude. Those best interests include preserving a child’s emotional
relationship with significant adults in the child’s life, even if they were not
parents by marriage, blood, or adoption.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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A. Alison D. v. Virginia M. (1991)26—Standing of
De Facto Parent to Seek Visitation (Dissenting Opinion)
In Alison D. the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of what kind of
relationship with a child qualified an adult as a “parent” authorized to seek
visitation under the relevant section of the New York Domestic Relations
Law § 70.27 The petitioner was a nonbiological, nonadoptive adult (a “de
facto parent”) who raised a child with the biological parent in a long-term
same-sex relationship. The parties agreed to raise the child together, and
the petitioner’s long-term relationship with the child was “encouraged or
at least condoned by [the biological parent and] . . . apparently existed
between [the child] and the [de facto parent] during the first six years of the
child’s life.”28 Then the couple’s relationship ended, albeit not amicably.
The biological parent cut off the other parent’s visitation with the child
they had raised together.
In a per curiam opinion, the majority emphasized that the statutory
definition of “parent” meant only biological or adoptive parent, and it
was up to the legislature, not the court, to expand the definition.29 Thus,
the biological parent had the legal right to cut off the de facto parent’s
visitation with the child, and the de facto parent had no legal recourse. To
the majority, the child’s emotional connection with the de facto parent was
legally irrelevant.
Then-Associate-Judge Kaye was the lone but memorable dissenter. She
described the importance of the court’s decision by assessing the scope of
its impact on children:
The Court’s decision, fixing biology as the key to visitation rights,
has impact far beyond this particular controversy, one that may
affect a wide spectrum of relationships—including those of longtime
heterosexual stepparents, “common-law” and non-heterosexual
partners such as involved here, and even participants in scientific
reproduction procedures. Estimates that more than 15.5 million
children do not live with two biological parents, and that as many as
8 to 10 million children are born into families with a gay or lesbian
parent, suggest just how widespread the impact may be. . . .30

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
Id.
Id. at 30 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
Id. at 29 (majority op.).
Id. at 30 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
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Judge Kaye also argued that the function a relationship with an adult
plays in the child’s emotional life is more important than the form of the
relationship:
But the impact of today’s decision falls hardest on the children of
those [nontraditional family] relationships, limiting their opportunity
to maintain bonds that may be crucial to their development. The
majority’s retreat from the courts’ proper role—its tightening of rules
that should in visitation petitions, above all, retain the capacity to
take the children’s interests into account—compels this dissent.31
She emphasized the importance of judges focusing on the best interests of
children in judicial interpretation of a statute that so impacts them:
[I]n the absence of express legislative direction [we] have attempted
to read otherwise undefined words of the statute so as to effectuate
the legislative purposes. The Legislature has made plain an objective
. . . to promote “the best interest of the child” and the child’s “welfare
and happiness.” Those words should not be ignored by us in defining
standing for visitation purposes—they have not been in prior case
law.32
Finally, Judge Kaye emphasized that children’s best interests are more
important than the “rights” of parents.
[W]hen there is a conflict, the best interest of the child has always
been regarded as superior to the right of parental custody. Indeed,
analysis of the cases reveals a shifting of emphasis rather than
a remaking of substance. This shifting reflects more the modern
principle that a child is a person, and not a subperson over whom the
parent has an absolute possessory interest.33
Judge Kaye’s dissent was vindicated by subsequent history, well-described
in Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C.34 In brief, Alison D.’s emphasis on the
rights of the biological parent continued to be challenged in subsequent
litigation as out of touch with the needs of modern families and children.

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 494–95 (N.Y. 2016).
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Judge Kaye’s dissent in Alison D. gathered more support in a subsequent
decision without capturing a majority vote.35 Finally, in 2016—shortly
after Chief Judge Kaye died—the New York Court of Appeals overruled
Alison D. in Brooke S.B. and held that a de facto parent had standing to
seek visitation if the de facto parent had a preconception agreement to raise
the child with the biological parent.36 Although the Brooke S.B. majority
followed a somewhat narrower approach than Judge Kaye’s dissent in
Alison D., the court explicitly adopted her position that a child’s long-term
emotional connection with a de facto parent could take precedence over
the rights of a parent based on biology.37

B. In re Jacob (1995)38—Adoption by Unmarried Parents
(Same Sex and Heterosexual)
Four years after Alison D., in Jacob the Court of Appeals addressed
whether unmarried parents—heterosexual or homosexual—could adopt
a child.39 To answer that question, the Court of Appeals had to interpret
a complex, often amended, and linguistically inconsistent statute that
attempted to define who had standing to adopt.40 As in Alison D., Jacob
presented the court with the question of whether the legislature had to
explicitly amend the adoption statute to extend standing to adopt to
unmarried parents or whether the court should interpret the statute to allow
it and thus serve the emotional best interests of the children waiting to be
adopted.41
By now Judge Kaye had become Chief Judge Kaye and wrote for a 4–3
majority that the adoptions sought—“one by an unmarried heterosexual
couple, the other by the lesbian partner of the child’s mother”—were
“fully consistent with the adoption statute.”42 Echoing her dissent in
Alison D., Chief Judge Kaye reasoned that, while the adoption statute
“must be strictly construed,” the “primary loyalty of the courts must be to
the statute’s legislative purpose—the child’s best interest.”43

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 201 (N.Y. 2010) (Ciparick, J., concurring).
Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 490.
Id. at 499–500.
In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995).
Id. at 398.
Id. at 399.
Id.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 399.
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In her oral history, Chief Judge Kaye expressed a special personal
fondness for her opinion in Jacob but also hinted that the case caused
unusual division in the Court of Appeals:
I mean, I’ve been in places where people have come up to me
and said, “Thank you, thank you for Jacob.” Jacob, of course, is
a statutory construction case, construing the adoption statute—the
Domestic Relations Law of the State of New York. The Court upheld
the right of a same-sex partner to adopt a child. I hardly thought it
was the end of the world—it just seemed so right to me—but I think
you have a clue to the difficulty we had in reaching that decision if
you look at the number of months that elapsed between the date that
it was argued and the date that it was handed down. I haven’t gone
back and checked recently, but I know it went over the summer and
it was probably maybe four or five or six months between the date
the case was argued and the date it was handed down, ultimately a
four-three decision. One Judge was plainly holding open the door.
RM [interviewer for the oral history, Hon. Robert M. Mandelbaum]:
I think it was May to November.
JSK: Yes. For the Court of Appeals, that’s a very unusual time
difference. I’m proud of the Court; it was absolutely the right thing to
do. I say, it pleases me so much to have a continued affirmance of the
case. It helped to give me your son, Robert, my own godson, right?
RM: Absolutely.44

C. Nicholson v. Scoppetta (2004)45—Domestic Violence,
Child Abuse, and Neglect
In her oral history, Chief Judge Kaye described this case as follows:
“Nicholson concerned domestic violence . . . that has been a great interest
of mine.”46 The genesis and evolution of Chief Judge Kaye’s interest in
domestic violence will be summarized later in this article.47 It suffices to
note at this point that it extended far beyond opinion writing to creating
44.
45.
46.
47.

Kaye, Oral History, supra note 15, at 115–16.
820 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2004).
Kaye, Oral History, supra note 15, at 116.
See infra Part III.B.
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changes in court structure to better address the needs of victims and their
children. Nicholson v. Scoppetta provided Chief Judge Kaye with the
opportunity to move public policy about domestic violence in a direction
that served those same ends.
Chief Judge Kaye herself provided a pithy and passionate description of
the key issue in Nicholson in her oral history, “How outrageous is that, as if
being a victim of domestic violence isn’t enough, you get your kids taken
away?”48 Chief Judge Kaye also described the legal issues in Nicholson as
“another good statutory interpretation that brought fairness and justice to
the [child neglect] statute.”49
The procedural context of Nicholson gave the Court of Appeals
particular latitude to shape public policy through statutory interpretation.
In Nicholson, victims of domestic violence brought a class action in federal
court contending that New York City’s child welfare authorities had a
policy of automatically seeking to remove a child from a parent’s care for
child neglect if the parent allowed the child to witness domestic violence.50
They claimed this policy violated their federally protected rights. But they
also raised statutory questions—whether the policy of automatic removal
was in conflict with New York’s child neglect statutes.51
Rather than resolve the issues of interpretation of New York statutes
itself, the federal Second Circuit Court of Appeals asked the New York
Court of Appeals to answer “certified questions” about them.52 The
“certified questions” raised pure questions of law not tied to the facts of
any particular case.53 This gave the New York Court of Appeals significant
latitude in establishing the appropriate balance between the protection of
children from harm and fairness to victims of violence. As Chief Judge
Kaye described it:
[B]ecause when we get a case in the Court of Appeals, facts and law,
often the facts will circumscribe the articulation of the law a little bit.
When a case comes to us from the Second Circuit, what they’re doing
is certifying to us a question of New York law, which we decide in
the abstract. There are facts, of course, but the Second Circuit wants

48. Kaye, Oral History, supra note 15, at 124.
49. Id. at 116.
50. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 842–43; see also Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154 (2d
Cir. 2003).
51. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 844–45; see generally N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §§ 1012(f), 1022,
1024, 1027, 1028 (McKinney 2021).
52. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 844.
53. 2d Cir. R. 27.2.
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to know, from the Court of Appeals, what the answer is on the law,
and then send the case back to them and they will apply the law as we
have stated, to the facts that are before them. . . . So what Nicholson
enabled us to do, by just having that abstract question of law, was to
articulate a principle of law, proposition of law, regarding domestic
violence cases that had very, very widespread impact, probably
more so than had we decided it ourselves, had we applied it to the
facts ourselves. It’s had a really good life I think; it’s a very good
proposition.54
Chief Judge Kaye’s opinion redrew the boundaries between child neglect
law and domestic violence.55 The fundamental impact of Nicholson was
to eliminate the child welfare agency’s use of automatic presumptions to
determine whether a victim’s allowing a child to witness domestic violence
against her was child neglect. Rather, Nicholson required careful analysis
of the particular facts without reference to presumptions.
Briefly, the Court of Appeals held that evidence that the respondent
parent has been the victim of domestic violence, and that the child has
been exposed to that violence, without more, is insufficient to find that
the child has been neglected.56 It also held that “under the Family Court
Act there can be no ‘blanket presumption’ favoring removal when a child
witnesses domestic violence, and . . . each case is fact-specific.”57
The plain language of the section and the legislative history supporting
it establish that a blanket presumption favoring removal was never
intended. The court must do more than identify the existence of a risk
of serious harm. Rather, a court must weigh, in the factual setting
before it, whether the imminent risk to the child can be mitigated by
reasonable efforts to avoid removal. It must balance that risk against
the harm removal might bring, and it must determine factually which
course is in the child’s best interests.58

54. Kaye, Oral History, supra note 15, at 116.
55. Justine A. Dunlop, Judging Nicholson: An Assessment of Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 82
Denv. Univ. L. Rev. 671 (2005).
56. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 844–47.
57. Id. at 854.
58. Id. at 852 (emphasis in original).
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Additionally, with respect to emergency/ex parte removals, the court held:
[A] court may enter an order directing the temporary removal of a
child from home before the filing of a petition if three factors are met.
First, the parent must be absent or, if present, must have been asked
and refused to consent to temporary removal of the child and must
have been informed of an intent to apply for an order. Second, the
child must appear to suffer from abuse or neglect of a parent or
other person legally responsible for the child’s care to the extent that
immediate removal is necessary to avoid imminent danger to the
child’s life or health. Third, there must be insufficient time to file a
petition and hold a preliminary hearing.59
The relationship between domestic violence and child neglect is a
complex and controversial subject, and a full discussion of the impact of
Nicholson on it is beyond the scope of this article.60 It suffices to note here
only that the case is a landmark. The decision raised consciousness in the
relevant stakeholder communities about the need for careful analysis and
individualized treatment of victims of domestic violence and the impact of
violence on their children. Nicholson has been repeatedly cited for its clear
articulation of what the government must prove in a neglect case involving
a victim of domestic violence.61 The Administration for Children’s Services
(ACS) reformed its practices after the litigation. A few years after the case
was decided, the agency was “removing fewer children,” “charging fewer
victims of domestic violence with neglect solely because of the exposure
of their children to domestic violence,” and charging more batterers with
neglect.62

59. Id.
60. See generally Dunlop, supra note 55; Lynn F. Beller, When in Doubt Take Them Out:
Removal of Children from Victims of Domestic Violence Ten Years After Nicholson v. Williams,
22 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 205 (2015).
61. See, e.g., Natasha W. v. N.Y. State Off. of Child. & Fam. Servs., 110 N.E.3d 503, 504
(2018) (citing the standard set forth in Nicholson and stating, “[o]n this record, it was rational
for the Administrative Law Judge to have concluded that the child was placed in imminent risk
of impairment, constituting maltreatment”); In re Lexie CC., 138 N.Y.S.3d 753, 756 (2021).
(quoting Nicholson, stating “[i]n determining whether a parent has failed to exercise a minimum
degree of care, the dispositive inquiry is ‘whether a reasonable and prudent parent [would] have
so acted, or failed to act, under the circumstances’”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. See generally Tina Lee, Child Welfare Practice in Domestic Violence Cases in New York
City: Problems for Poor Women of Color, 3 J. Women, Gender & Families Color 58 (2015).
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D. Hernandez v. Robles (2006)63—Constitutionality of Prohibition
on Same-Sex Marriage (Dissenting Opinion)
In Hernandez, a four-judge majority of the Court of Appeals held that
New York’s Domestic Relations Law limits marriage to opposite-sex
couples, and rejected the argument that this limitation violated the due
process and equal protection provisions of the New York Constitution.64
Chief Judge Kaye dissented and memorably wrote, “I am confident that
future generations will look back on today’s decision as an unfortunate
misstep.”65
The majority decision caused Chief Judge Kaye great regret as she felt
it betrayed the New York judiciary’s historic commitment to the welfare of
families and the best interests of children. As she stated in her oral history:
Hernandez is my constant heartbreak, because I thought the State of
New York, by the time the case came to us—it was unthinkable to
me that we would not approve, uphold, as a matter of constitutional
law, the right to marriage; it’s so fundamental. I watched the
Massachusetts court and then a few others, and I thought, surely,
New York, New York State, that by the time it got to us, that we
would issue a decision that would be a fortification of the proposition
that would turn the issue decisively. And it was just incredible to me
that it didn’t and that I had to dissent.66
Subsequent events may have eased Chief Judge Kaye’s “heartbreak”
over Hernandez. It indeed proved itself to be an “unfortunate misstep”
in the history of marriage equality and was rapidly corrected. Marriage
equality became the law of New York when the State Legislature legalized
same-sex marriage five years after Hernandez.67 In 2015, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided Obergefell, which declared state law bans on same-sex
marriage unconstitutional using essentially the same constitutional
reasoning Chief Judge Kaye advanced in her Hernandez dissent.68

63. 855 N.E.2d 1 (2006), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
64. Id. at 12.
65. Id. at 34 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
66. Kaye, Oral History, supra note 15, at 117.
67. N.Y. Dom Rel. Law § 10A-1 (effective July 24, 2011) (“A marriage that is otherwise
valid shall be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same or different
sex.”).
68. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 664 (2015).
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III. The Problem-Solving Courts
A. The Philosophy of Problem-Solving Judging
Chief Judge Kaye’s family law opinions are a strong basis for her
nomination for a place in the family law pioneers’ hall of fame. But she
accomplished even more for families and children in her capacity as the
Chief Judge of the State of New York, the Chief Executive Officer of the
New York Court System. In that capacity, she planned and implemented
problem-solving courts focused on creating effective responses to
challenges such as drug abuse, mental illness, and domestic violence,
which are the underlying causes that bring many families to court.
As described on the New York State Court System’s website:
Problem-solving courts look to the underlying issues that bring people
into the court system, and employ innovative approaches to address
those issues. Through intensive judicial monitoring, coordination with
outside services, treatment where appropriate, the removal of barriers
between courts and increased communication with stakeholders, these
courts are able to change the way our system manages cases and
responds to individuals, families and communities.69
Chief Judge Kaye described the functioning of the problem-solving courts
in her oral history:
[T]he traditional way [courts administer cases] is to deal with them by
taking the case in and managing it to disposition. The problem-solving
courts are a different route, and it’s turning the prism just a little bit to
figure out whether the interventions—the court intervention, the time
the court spends on the case, can be more constructively utilized than
simply disposing of the case, the issue. Probably the most typical
example would be a young drug offender, somebody—and I’ll take
the easiest case. Not easy, but most easily demonstrates what I’m
trying to say would be a repeat drug user, possessor, drug offender
under the laws of the State of New York, who could be arrested and
prosecuted and, in the end, maybe, because the process takes so long,
would be held, incarcerated, in jail. The sentence could be nothing
more than time served. Then the offender goes back, right to the

69. Overview: Problem Solving Courts, N.Y. State Unified Ct. Sys., http://ww2.nycourts.
gov/COURTS/problem_solving/index.shtml (last visited June 8, 2021).
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same place, and gets arrested again and the process begins again
and goes to the same conclusion, until there’s a sheet called a rap
sheet, which is the sheet of the defendant’s encounters with the court
system, that is six feet long.
So problem-solving courts are an effort, really, to intercept, to try
to reroute the person, take them off that pathway back to the Port
Authority Bus Terminal, or prostitution, or graffiti, or illegal
vending.70
Problem-solving judging reframes traditional notions of what a judge’s
role is by focusing on it as a potentially positive intervention in the lives
of the people who come before the court. The traditional judge’s role
was famously captured by Chief Justice John Roberts, who said at his
confirmation hearing, “it’s my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch
or bat.”71 Chief Justice Roberts used the umpire analogy to highlight that
judges must be above partisanship and seek objectivity and neutrality in
disputes that courts adjudicate.
The problem-solving judge can also draw on a baseball analogy—
the general manager of the family justice system. General managers of
baseball teams are responsible for the overall operation of their team. They
analyze operations, decide how to allocate the team budget, negotiate
contracts, and make trades that benefit the organization and its fans. The
team general manager supports player development but also disciplines
players and team personnel who deserve it.
The problem-solving family court judge is the general manager of the
case team for the families who come before the court. He or she supervises
a professional team, gathers resources in the community that might benefit
the families and children, and decides how those resources should be used
to positively affect individual cases. He or she manages individual cases
to provide services to address the underlying problems that the family
situation presents and ensure the parties participate in them. On a macro
level, in their general manager capacity, problem-solving judges plan and
implement changes in how services for the benefit of the children and
families who use the court system should be expanded or contracted.
Problem-solving courts have developed in a wide variety of subjects—
drug abuse, mental illness, adoption, child protection. Many of them

70. Kaye, Oral History, supra note 15, at 200–01.
71. John Roberts: “My Job Is to Call Balls and Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat,” CNN:
Politics (Sept. 12, 2005), https//www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/9/12/Roberts.statement/.
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deeply affect families and children. As of 2019, there were more than
3,100 problem-solving courts in the U.S.72 Problem-solving judging has
gained wide acceptance in the legal and judicial communities and has been
endorsed by the Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of State
Court Administrators.73
Chief Judge Kaye described the role of a problem-solving judge in an
address to the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges:
Judicial leadership is key for championing change to ensure that
children and families are better, not worse, off for being in the courts.
That may not sound like a remarkable discovery—of course we all
want to make things better for children and families in the courts.
But what I’m talking about goes to the very conception of the judge’s
role in the process.74
By establishing the legitimacy of problem-solving judging, Chief Judge
Kaye validated an alternate way of thinking about the role of courts for
families and children. Her service as a champion for the idea that courts
could be agents for positive change in the lives of parents and children is
a major part of her legacy.

B. Integrated Domestic Violence Courts
Chief Judge Kaye especially focused on the development of Integrated
Domestic Violence (IDV) courts to systematically address the needs
of victims and their children. Chief Judge Kaye traced her focus to a
particularly tragic case in Westchester in March 1993 in which a woman
was given an order of protection against her husband but was murdered
less than two weeks later. Her husband then committed suicide.75 The
conclusion Chief Judge Kaye eventually reached from analyzing what
happened in that case and others was that issuing an order of protection

72. Paul A. Haskins, Problem-Solving Courts: Fighting Crime by Treating the Offender,
Nat’l Int. Just. J., Nov. 2019, at 70, 71, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/252721.pdf.
73. In Support of Problem-Solving Courts, Conf. of Chief Justs. Res. 22 & Conf. of State Ct.
Adm’rs Res. 4 (Aug. 3, 2000), https://ccj.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/23462/08032000in-support-of-problem-solving-courts.pdf.
74. Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Strategies and Need for Systems Change: Improving Court
Practice for the Millennium, 38 Fam. & Conciliation Cts. Rev. 159, 162 (2000) (Address to
Millennium Conf. of the Nat’l Council of Juvenile & Fam. Ct. Judges, Washington, D.C. Nov.
15, 1999) (emphasis added); see also Judith S. Kaye, Delivering Justice Today: A ProblemSolving Approach, 22 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 125, 129–30 (2004).
75. Kaye, Oral History, supra note 15, at 122.
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was not sufficient to meet the needs of domestic violence victims; rather,
courts dealing with domestic violence cases should take a coordinated
approach, and services for victims and children had to be made available
to them as part of the court process.
Chief Judge Kaye recognized that the notoriously complex New York
trial court structure tolerated different courts responding to the same victim
and perpetrator of domestic violence with conflicting orders, timetables,
and resources. She thus fermented the creation of the IDV courts based on
the foundational one-judge, one-family organizational principle of unified
family courts to meet those needs:
[T]oday we have domestic violence courts. Because of our fractured
court system, you could have a case of, for example, if there were
some act of violence or an assault, you could have a case in Criminal
Court. You could have a case—the same parties simultaneously—in
the Family Court, if there was some issue concerning the children.
And simultaneously, you could have a separate case in the Supreme
Court, if there was some issue relating to the marriage. That serves
people who want to subvert the system and agonize the litigant,
because what you need—I think always it’s good, but particularly in
domestic violence cases, what the judge needs is very comprehensive
information. You really need to know everything about the parties
involved and their situation, and when you have a single, integrated
domestic violence court which is supported by the resources and the
people—I mean, like, where is a person going to live if she has to
leave home, or what about the children going to school, or where’s
the next meal going to come from? You need people who take these
matters very seriously and very comprehensively, and address the
situation. . . .
So I think we have learned as a court system and as a society, we
have learned a great deal more about domestic violence—not that
it doesn’t still go on and that we don’t have a lot more to learn. But
fortunately, I think our consciousness was really awakened by events
back in 1993.76

76. Kaye, Oral History, supra note 15, at 123–24.
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Today, the New York State Court System has established more than 40
IDV courts based on the model of one family–one judge.77 “The[se] [IDV]
courts seek to achieve more informed judicial decision-making, fewer
conflicting orders, improved service delivery to victims and their children,
and a more efficient and comprehensible case processing system.”78 They
are also the legacy of the victim of domestic violence in Westchester who
sparked Chief Judge Kaye’s commitment to creating a judicial system
responsive to the needs of victims and their children.

IV. Establishing the Role of the Attorney for the Child
In 2008 Chief Judge Kaye definitely resolved previous uncertainty
about the role of the Attorney for the Child (AFC) by issuing Rule 7.2
of the Rules of the Chief Judge, which held AFCs to similar standards
of professionalism and advocacy as a lawyer representing an adult.79 The
voices of children, she believed, should be heard in legal proceedings
that greatly affected them.80 They were thus entitled to a lawyer playing
a traditional advocate’s role guided by what the client wanted to achieve,
not what the lawyer thought was good for the client.81 Chief Judge Kaye
rejected the idea that AFCs were, in effect, informal guardians for children
who were free to substitute their judgment for that of their child-client.
AFCs may be appointed in many different types of cases—e.g., custody,
juvenile delinquency, foster care review, persons in need of supervision,
etc.82 The difference between representation by an AFC functioning
as a traditional lawyer representing an adult and a best interests lawyer
is profound for a child client. For example, assume a 12-year-old child

77. New York State’s Integrated Domestic Violence Model: Results from Four Recent
Studies, Ctr. for Ct. Innovation, https://www.courtinnovation.org/publications/new-york-statesintegrated-domestic-violence-court-model-results-four-recent-studies?gclid=CjwKCAjwqvyF
BhB7EiwAER786fXzuYOfFN0FFk9e-4B77QGF7SWpOjmYMazfliRV1jjCksF4mKieBRoCa
G4QAvD_BwE (last visited June 8, 2021); see also Amanda B. Cissner, Sarah Picard-Fritsche
& Michael Rempel, New York State’s Integrated Domestic Violence Court Model: Results from
Four Recent Studies, 2014 Domestic Violence Rep., Apr./May, at 51, 51.
78. Id.
79. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 7.2 (2021) (issued 2007); see also Merril
Sobie, The Attorney for the Child Comes of Age, N.Y.L.J. (Apr. 5, 2021), https://www.law.com/
newyorklawjournal/2021/04/05/the-attorney-for-the-child-comes-of-age/.
80. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 249 (2021).
81. Id.
82. Id. § 249(a). Counsel is required for juvenile delinquency, child welfare, person in need of
supervision, and other listed proceedings, and may be appointed in custody or other proceedings.
Id.; see also Model Act Governing the Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect and
Dependency Proceedings § 1(c)–(d) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2011), https://www-media.floridabar.org/
uploads/2017/09/171018-ABA-Model-ADAC.pdf [hereinafter ABA Model Act].
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wants to live primarily with his mother following a divorce. An AFC
following an adult model of representation would advocate for the child
to live primarily with his mother. Assume, however, that an AFC who
follows a “best interests” model of representation believes that the child’s
relationship with the father is more important than the child’s relationship
with the mother and the mother’s parenting style is too dogmatic and
authoritarian. That lawyer might conclude that the child’s preference for
the mother is not in the child’s best interests and “override” the preference
by advocating for placement with the father. A best interests lawyer
believes that the child-client’s preferences can be “overridden” by an adult
representative, much in the way that a guardian can “override” a ward’s
preferences because the ward is incompetent to make such a decision.
Until Chief Judge Kaye issued Rule 7.2, even the term used in New
York for lawyers for children—law guardian—reflected the ambiguity in
the philosophy of representing children. “Law” reflected the traditional
client-driven “like an adult” philosophy of lawyering, while “guardian”
signified the “best interests” approach.83 Two fundamentally different
approaches to representing a child client were merged into a single phrase.
The value preferences of the lawyer appointed to represent the child about
which approach to follow governed.84 “Representation was frequently
grounded upon the subjective views of appointed counsel; child ‘A’ hence
received vastly different representation than child ‘B’.”85
Exercising her administrative powers, Chief Judge Kaye rejected “best
interests” representation and issued a rule that codified the policy that
children are entitled to the same model and quality of advocacy as adults.86
Rule 7.2 referred to the child’s representative as the “attorney for the child”
(as opposed to law guardian). The rule—which is still in effect—clarifies
the nature of the representation child-clients should receive:
(b) The attorney for the child is subject to the ethical requirements
applicable to all lawyers, including but not limited to constraints
on: ex parte communication; disclosure of client confidences and
attorney work product; conflicts of interest; and becoming a witness
in the litigation.

83. See ABA Model Act, supra note 82, § (1)(c), for more precise definitions of “Child’s
Lawyer” as distinct from “Best Interests Advocate.”
84. Sobie, supra note 79.
85. Id.
86. Id.; see N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 7.2 (2021).
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(c) In juvenile delinquency and person in need of supervision
proceedings, where the child is the respondent, the attorney for the
child must zealously defend the child.
(d) In other types of proceedings, where the child is the subject, the
attorney for the child must zealously advocate the child’s position.
(1) In ascertaining the child’s position, the attorney for the child
must consult with and advise the child to the extent of and in a
manner consistent with the child’s capacities, and have a thorough
knowledge of the child’s circumstances.
(2) If the child is capable of knowing, voluntary and considered
judgment, the attorney for the child should be directed by the
wishes of the child, even if the attorney for the child believes
that what the child wants is not in the child’s best interests. The
attorney should explain fully the options available to the child,
and may recommend to the child a course of action that in the
attorney’s view would best promote the child’s interests.
(3) When the attorney for the child is convinced either that the
child lacks the capacity for knowing, voluntary and considered
judgment, or that following the child’s wishes is likely to result
in a substantial risk of imminent, serious harm to the child, the
attorney for the child would be justified in advocating a position
that is contrary to the child’s wishes. In these circumstances, the
attorney for the child must inform the court of the child’s articulated
wishes if the child wants the attorney to do so, notwithstanding the
attorney’s position.87
Firmly establishing that an AFC ordinarily has the same responsibility
to his or her client as a lawyer for an adult is another landmark
achievement in Chief Judge Kaye’s portfolio of progress for parents and
children in the legal system. Chief Judge Kaye’s rule generated ripples of
additional reform as its philosophy became a foundational part of family
law proceedings. Two years after the rule was promulgated, in 2010, the
New York legislature amended the relevant section of the Family Court

87. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 7.2(b)–(d) (2021).
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Act, substituting the words “attorney for the child” for “law guardian.”88
Citing Chief Judge Kaye’s rule, subsequent cases reinforced the idea
that attorneys for children should be vigorous advocates for their client’s
preferences rather than their perception of their client’s best interests.89

V. The Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for Children
In her 2011 oral history, Chief Judge Kaye traced her passion for
bettering the lives of families and children in court to her becoming chair
of the New York State Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for
Children in 1988:
I want to step back—a couple of decades, in fact—to the mideighties, when Sol Wachtler . . . became the Chief Judge, replacing
Larry Cooke, his idea was to have a commission, he called it the
Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for Children. And he
told me, I remember at the time, that when word went out that this
commission was being organized, he had more people submitting
their names, wanting to be part of this than for anything else he had
done. And for, I guess, a couple of years, the commission sort of
stumbled along. It never really got going well, and he would talk
to me about it from time to time, until once he said to me—I think
it had to be around 1988—he said, “Why don’t you take over this
commission? I think you’d really enjoy it.” And I said, “That’s
ridiculous, you know, I’ve spent my life in commercial subjects; I
don’t know anything about this area of the law, that everything is in
acronyms that I can’t figure out, and I think it would be a mistake.”
But he persisted and ultimately, I stepped into the role as co-chair,
with Ellen Schall as my—now the Dean of the Wagner School of
Public Policy at New York University—as my co-chair. So together
we co-chaired that commission for a couple of years, until Ellen one
day told me that she was going to leave me; she felt I could do it on

88. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 242 (2021); see also Representation of Children, 2010 N.Y. Sess.
Laws ch. 41 (A. 7805-B) (McKinney 2021).
89. See Jennifer V.V. v. Lawrence W.W., 130 N.Y.S.3d 121 (App. Div. 2020) (“best interests”
determination made by court not AFC); Silverman v. Silverman, 129 N.Y.S.3d 86 (App. Div.
2019) (reversing trial court custody determination because AFC stated child’s preference but
used litigation tactics that undermined child’s position); Newton v. McFarlane, 103 N.Y.S.3d
445 (App. Div. 2019) (child has right to appeal adverse custody determination against child’s
preferences); see generally Sobie, supra note 79.
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my own. And to this day, I chair the Permanent Judicial Commission
on Justice for Children. It is a centerpiece of my life.90
Under Chief Judge Kaye’s leadership, the Commission brought about
systemic reform to benefit families and children—including convening
stakeholders, conducting research, developing pilot projects, creating
written materials and tools, presenting trainings, and initiating efforts to
change policy and practice through changes in rules and legislation.
At its inception, the Commission predominantly targeted its efforts
toward the youngest children coming before the courts—securing early
intervention, establishing a statewide system of Children’s Centers in the
Courts, improving court proceedings, promoting the healthy development
of children in foster care, and focusing on the needs of infants involved
in child welfare proceedings. The Children’s Centers were an especially
notable Commission project. They provided a “safe haven” for children
who accompany their parents to court.91
Today there are more than thirty centers in New York State, serving
more than 51,000 children annually. These children centers provide
a two-pronged service: (1) quality drop-in child care services while
their caregivers attend to court business; and (2) a site—possibly
the only place until a child enters school—where families can learn
about and gain access to vital services such as Early Intervention,
Head Start, WIC, and Food Stamps.92
In 1994, the New York State Court of Appeals designated the
Commission to implement the New York State Court Improvement
Project (“CIP”), a federally funded project to assess and improve
foster care, termination of parental rights and adoption proceedings.93
Since 2006, the Commission has expanded its focus to include older
youth involved with the courts. Chief Judge Kaye commented on that focus
in her oral history and described in part how the Commission developed
one of its signature initiatives—changing school disciplinary practices to
keep kids in school and out of court:

90. Kaye, Oral History, supra note 15, at 117–18.
91. Anthony J. Sciolino, The Changing Role of the Family Court Judge: New Ways of
Stemming the Tide, 3 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 395, 408 (2005).
92. Id. at 409–10.
93. Id. at 409.
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Well, I think what I feel good about right now is that first of all,
this has been a tremendous interest of mine through the Permanent
Judicial Commission on Justice for Children. I told you we changed
our lens from zero-to-three to adolescents, as a kind of a last clear
chance, and the Commission has been working on projects around
adolescents. And lo and behold, the sea has changed around us. I
think it’s just so terrific that I pick up the paper every day and I see
a task force on out-of-state placements for young children and how
damaging that is. I see the State of Texas, which has 900,000 pieces
of data on children from the seventh grade through graduation and
beyond about the effects of school discipline on children. I see this
with brain research on adolescent children. It seems to me that the
air is alive with interest in reaching out to adolescents to keep them
out of our prisons, out of our courts. You know, the only way you
get to prison is through the court, so when I say keep them out of
prison—nobody goes voluntarily. So keep them out of the courts;
keep them in their schools. Let’s figure out what to do with them
after that, but keep them in their schools. And it’s very exciting to
me that as we have been pursuing this path, that it’s just bubbling all
around us, to the point where a foundation actually reached out to
me. I still am not comfortable raising money—it’s something I never
had to do as a judge—and they came to me to say that they would
fund a nationwide summit. And I think they see what I’ve told you
I see about my life as Chief Judge, which is my ability to convene
the most knowledgeable people, dedicated people, to do something
really important about this issue.94

VI. A Chief Judge for Families and Children
Through her opinions and administrative achievements, Chief Judge
Kaye played an extraordinary role in modernizing the New York State
judicial system’s understanding and treatment of families. No one expected
that focus and those achievements when Judge Kaye was first appointed. In
her 2016 obituary, the New York Times noted that the judicial nominating
commission’s 1983 list of seven candidates for the vacancy on the Court
of Appeals, which Chief Judge Kaye filled by appointment from Governor
Mario Cuomo, included two women: a sitting State Supreme Court justice
who had served as president of the Women’s Bar Association; and Chief
Judge Kaye, “whom the association, in contrast to other bar groups, rated
94. Kaye, Oral History, supra note 15, at 256–57.
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not qualified.”95 When Governor Cuomo appointed Chief Judge Kaye
anyway, despite the rating from the Women’s Bar Association, the New
York Times reported that Marjorie E. Karowe, then the president of the
women’s bar group, called Governor Cuomo’s decision “unfortunate.”96
The New York Times then reported: “By 2008, Ms. Karowe had reversed
her verdict. ‘Judge Kaye,’ she said, ‘has proved herself to be a remarkable
chief judge.’”97
Chief Judge Kaye’s focus on the welfare of families and children evolved
and expanded over a long career. A full exploration of her motives and
methods awaits a longer scholarly examination. A few takeaways about
her philosophy of bringing about change in a complex judicial system
where stakeholders (often judges) are resistant to change are, however,
appropriate.

A. Develop Consensus.
Chief Judge Kaye understood the importance of developing consensus
in support of change, whether among her colleagues on the Court of
Appeals or stakeholders in a proposed judicial system reorganization.
B. Treat Your Opposition Seriously and Generously,
but Move Forward, if Necessary, Without Them.
Chief Judge Kaye was hardly a naïve optimist. She knew there would
always be resistance to the reforms that she advocated for that had to be
contended with. She described her generous approach to her opposition in
her oral history:
I got a . . . lesson, too, once we announced our reforms [new rules
for the divorce bar’s relationship with clients] which is the word
“pushback.” People hollered and screamed and carried on when
we announced what the reforms were, and hollering and carrying
on and screaming is the typical reaction to everything you try to
change. I call it “pushback.” I became very familiar with pushback
and even more familiar with “push forward,” because the change
was necessary—change was good. It was just tough. I shouldn’t be
too arrogant in saying that, because it’s very easy to advocate for
change when you are the person imposing change. It’s a lot harder

95. Roberts, supra note 1.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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to advocate for change when you are the person who has to do the
changing. . . .
You just can’t proclaim rules and go about your business. You have
to be there on the scene to make them happen.98
Chief Judge Kaye never demonized those who “pushed back” on her
reforms but tried to persuade and educate them. Eventually, however, if
persuasion failed, she moved forward.

C. Project a “Can Do” Spirit that Attracts Reform-minded People.
Chief Judge Kaye’s personality and leadership style encouraged
innovation and a “can do” spirit that inspired those around her to aspire
higher, a trait captured in the following excerpt from her oral history:
Now you know my most unfavorite word is “pushback,” and I
certainly heard that a lot and saw that a lot. But my four favorite
words, especially from judges but from anybody, were, “I have an
idea.” . . .
I just loved hearing that.99
Her optimism attracted good people with good ideas to work on projects
she cared about. She supported and developed those innovations, and the
people who came up with them.

D. Project a Positive Vision of What Courts Can Achieve.
Above all, Chief Judge Kaye conveyed a powerful and inspirational
vision of a court system that serves families and children humanely,
modernizes legal doctrine to meet the needs of contemporary families,
and addresses the underlying problems that brought them to court. That
vision remains a beacon of hope for all of us concerned with the welfare
of families and children.
Chief Judge Kaye’s legacy lives on. She would be pleased that there is a
high school with branches in Manhattan and Queens named after her. The
high school’s mission is:

98. Kaye, Oral History, supra note 15, at 184–85.
99. Id. at 206.
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To provide access to a meaningful high school experience for
students who have faced significant barriers to their education,
building the skills necessary to become independent and successful
in a competitive, post-secondary world.100
Chief Judge Kaye would want to make sure, though, that the staff of the
school was diverse, innovative, optimistic, and excellent. She would also
want to make sure that the staff had the resources they need to meet the
challenges they face.

VII. Conclusion
The work of reforming the legal system for the benefit of the families
and children never ends. But today’s work begins at a better place because
of Chief Judge Kaye’s legacy. Her ground-breaking opinions sensitized
the family law community to emerging family structures and the emotional
needs of children. She administered a complex judicial system to realize
innovative ideas about the role of courts in dealing with families in crisis
and brought talented, committed people together to create positive change.
She showed us all what was possible with leadership and energy. The best
way to honor her legacy is to continue with the work she would be proud
of. If you “have an idea” to make the family law system function better for
families and children and work to implement it, you can be sure that Chief
Judge Kaye looks down on you from heaven with her trademark wisdom,
grace, and smile.

100. Judith S. Kaye High School, https://www.jskhigh.org (last visited June 20, 2021).
Published in Family Law Quarterly, Volume 55, Number 3, 2021–2022. © 2022 American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof
may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

